Abstract. We investigate the discrete logarithm problem over jacobians of hyperelliptic curves suitable for public-key cryptosystems. We focus on the case when the definition field has small characteristic 2, 3, 5 and 7, then we present hyperelliptic cryptosystems that resist against all known attacks. We further implement our designed hyperelliptic cryptosystems over finite fields F 2 n in software on Alpha and Pentium-II computers.
Introduction

Hyperelliptic Cryptosystems
Koblitz [Ko88, Ko89] investigated jacobians of hyperelliptic curves defined over finite fields as a source of finite abelian groups suitable for cryptographic discrete logarithm problems. As a motivation of the cryptographic research, Koblitz gave the following conjectural remark [Ko88, : "Thus, as far as we know, discrete log cryptosystems using J(F p n ) seem to be secure for relatively small p n (even when p = 2). From the standpoint of implementation, this feature may outweigh the added time required to compute the more complicated group operation." Frey and Rück's generalization [FR94] of solved in subexponential time the discrete logarithm problems over some of Koblitz's designed hyperelliptic cryptosystems [Ko89] . However, Sakai, Sakurai and Ishizuka designed hyperelliptic cryptosystems [SSI98] that resist against all known attacks including the Frey and Rück's method [FR94] . Furthermore, Sakai et al. [SSI98] analyzed the computational complexity on the group operation in jacobians. Their results theoretically support the Koblitz's conjecture referred to above.
In this work, we further explores hyperelliptic discrete logarithms for obtaining more efficient public key cryptosystems, and confirms experimentally the Koblitz's conjecture on the practical merit of hyperelliptic cryptosystems.
Our Investigated Topics
We consider the following topics to address as challenging problems after [Ko88] [Ko89,SSI98].
Designing secure hyperelliptic cryptosystems with genus 2 curves over small characteristic fields
Koblitz [Ko88, Ko89] presented jacobians of curves C : v 2 + h(u)v = f (u), where deg(f (u)) = 5 (genus 2), defined over F 2 . However, some discrete logarithms of the curves had been broken by Frey and Rück [FR94] . As a negative result, Sakai et al. [SSI98] experimentally showed that no secure curve exists with genus 2 among those defined over F 2 and h(u) = 1. Recently developed other methods [BK98, Fr97, CMT97] have generated secure hyperelliptic cryptosystems with genus 2. However, these require the size of the characteristic of curve's definition field to be large. 2. Designing secure hyperelliptic cryptosystems over F 2 n with smaller n Sakai et al.
[SSI98] examined jacobians over F 2 n with genus g = 3, 11 curves v 2 + v = u 2g+1 , which resist against all known attacks. However, their construction requires a large extension-degree n. For example, for achieving the security as RSA with 1024-bit key, the jacobian of the curve v 2 +v = u 7 must be defined over F 2 59 or larger fields. They also confirmed that the jacobian of the curve v 2 + v = u 23 (genus 11) over F 2 47 induces a secure hyperelliptic cryptosystem with the same level of security as RSA with 5000-bit key. This can be efficiently ( without multi-precision library ) implemented via software on 64-bit CPU (e.g. Alpha). However, no secure hyperelliptic cryptosystem is available from this curve with smaller n than 47. We want such a jacobian over F 2 n with hopefully n ≤ 32 for an efficient software implementation on 32-bit CPU (e.g. Pentium).
Implementing hyperelliptic cryptosystem in software
Indeed, the formulas for adding divisors in a jacobian are more complex compared to formulas for adding points in an elliptic curve. However, as we first remarked, Koblitz [Ko88] suggested that hyperelliptic cryptosystems defined over a small definition field may be efficient in practice. Sakai et al.
[SSI98] evaluated encryption/decryption speed which should that hyperelliptic cryptosystems are indeed practical. However, their confirmation was only theoretical, and no performance via a practical implementation has been reported.
Our Results
On Design with Genus Two In the case of characteristic 2, we have found secure jacobians by considering a more wider class of h(u) (degree of h(u) has at most g). Moreover, in the case of C : v 2 = f (u) over characteristic 3, 5 and 7 finite fields, where deg(f (u)) = 5 (genus 2), we have found many curves which resist against all known attacks.
On Design with Smaller Size of F 2 n By not choosing curves from
but from a wider class v 2 + v = f (u), we have found secure jacobians over F 2 n with "n ≤ 32" that achieve the same (or higher) level of security as RSA with 1024-bit key.
On Implementation We have implemented operations in jacobians via software. One platform was Alpha 21164A (467MHz) with 64-bit word size, and another was Pentium-II (300MHz) with 32-bit word size. Programs were written in C-language and compiled with GCC. Our software implementation of secure jacobians, which have the same level of security as RSA with 1024-bit key, achieve good practical performance. In an exponentiation of a randomly chosen divisor, the jacobian over F 2 59 of the genus 3 curve C : v 2 + v = u 7 achieved 83.3 msec. on Alpha 21164A (467MHz), and the jacobian over F 2 29 of the genus 6 curve C : v 2 + v = u 13 + u 11 + u 7 + u 3 + 1 achieved 476 msec. on Pentium-II (300MHz). We have also implemented secure jacobians which have the same level of security as RSA with 5000-bit key. In an exponentiation of a randomly chosen divisor, the jacobian over F 2 47 of the genus 11 curve C : v 2 + v = u 23 achieved 1.74 sec. on Alpha 21164A (467MHz). Note that those jacobians can be implemented without "a multi-precision library", because of the size of the definition fields.
Our Approach
Our Considered Security We design hyperelliptic cryptosystems that resist against the following four known attacks: Our design further notes new attacks improving the parallerized PollardLambda search [WZ98, GLV98] .
On Choosing Curves and Counting the Order of their Jacobian In [Ko88] , Koblitz investigated the jacobians of the hyperelliptic curves v 2 + v = u 2g+1 over finite field for cryptographically intractable discrete logarithm. In [Ko89] , Koblitz also discussed the jacobians of the hyperelliptic curves of more general form v 2 + h(u)v = f (u), however, the degree of the polynomial f (u) is restricted to be 5 (i.e. genus 2) and the definition fields are only the case of characteristic 2. In order to obtain a broader class of jacobians suitable for secure discrete logarithms, we deal with a wider family of the hyperelliptic curves v 2 + v = f (u) and v 2 = f (u) over finite field of characteristic 2, 3, 5 and 7, where deg(f (u))=2g + 1.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give a brief description of jacobians. See [Ko98] for more detail.
Let F be a finite field and letF be the algebraic closure of F. A hyperelliptic curve C of genus g over F is an equation of the form C :
is a monic polynomial of degree 2g + 1, and there are no solutions (u, v) ∈F ×F which simultaneously satisfy the equation v 2 + h(u)v = f (u) and the partial derivative equations 2v + h(u) = 0 and h (u)v − f (u) = 0. Thus, a hyperelliptic curve does not have singular points.
A divisor on C is a finite formal sum ofF-points D = m i P i , m i ∈ Z. We define the degree of D to be deg(D) = m i . If K is an algebraic extension of F, we say that D is defined over K if for every automorphism σ ofF that fixes K one has
where P σ denotes the point obtained by applying σ to the coordinates of P (and ∞ σ = ∞). Let D denote the additive group of divisors defined over K (where K is fixed), and let D 0 denote the subgroup consisting of divisors of degree 0. The principal divisors form a subgroup P of D 0 . J(K) = D 0 /P is called the "jacobian" of the curve C. In this paper, we denote J(C; K) also the jacobian defined over K of the curve C.
The discrete logarithm problem on J(C; K) is the problem, given two divisors
Security Against Known Attacks
We will choose jacobians to satisfy the following four conditions to resist against all known attacks. C1 : J(C; F q ) is divisible by a large prime C2 : J(C; F q ) can not be imbedded into a small finite field F q k C3 : 2g + 1 ≤ log q C4 : Jacobian over a field of characteristic p has not a cyclic group structure of order p n for small n. Our design further notes new attacks improving the parallerized PollardLambda search [WZ98, GLV98] .
C1 : General Algorithms
The condition C1 is to resist Pohlig-Hellman method [PH78] . The algorithm has a running time that is proportional to the square root of the largest prime factor of J(C; F q ). Therefore, we need to choose curves such that J(C; F q ) has a large prime factor.
C2 : Imbedding into a Small Finite Field
The condition C2 is to resist Frey and Rück's generalization [FR94] of MOVattack [MOV93] using Tate pairing. Their method reduces the logarithm problem over J(C; F q ) to the logarithm problem over an extension field F q k . Methods of avoiding MOV-attack have been discussed in [BS91,CTT94]. We take the similar approach by choosing curves such that the induced jacobian J(C; F q ) cannot be imbedded via Tate pairing into F q k with small extension degree k. Therefore, we replace C2 by the following sufficient condition:
C3 : Large Genus Hyperelliptic Curves
The condition C3 is to resist Adleman-DeMarrais-Huang method [ADH94]. They found a sub-exponential algorithm for discrete logarithm over the rational subgroup of the jacobians of large genus hyperelliptic curves over finite fields. It is a heuristic algorithm under certain assumptions. Therefore, we need to choose curves such that the genus of curves is not so large.
C4 : Additive Embedding Attack
The condition C4 is to resist Rück's generalization [Ru97] of the Semaev-SmartSatoh-Araki attack [Sem98, Sm97, SA97] on elliptic cryptosystems with Frobenius trace one. The method uses an additive version of Tate pairing to solve the discrete logarithm of a jacobian over a finite field of characteristic p and has the running time O(n 2 logp) for a jacobian with cyclic group structure of order p n . We should remark that our design is in small characteristic p = 2, 3, 5 and 7. Subgroups of the jacobians that we consider have order prime to the characteristic p. Therefore, this additive embedding attack does not apply to our cryptosystems.
Improved Parallerized Pollard-Lambda Search
New attacks have been announced, which improved the parallerized PollardLambda search [WZ98, GLV98] . For elliptic curves over F 2 n with coefficients in F 2 , this attacking time can be reduced by a factor of the square root of 2n. For example, the time required to compute an elliptic curve logarithm on such a curve over F 2 163 is reduced from the previous 2 81 to 2 77 elliptic curve operations. This could be applicable to our designed hyperelliptic cryptosystems in characteristic 2, because the coefficients of our curves belong to F 2 . We should note that the power of this attack is not so strong as the four listed above. However, this attack is very important to our selection of the size of securityparameter, which effects the performance analysis of our cryptosystems. Therefore, we should consider the security against possible extension of this kind of attack in our design of hyperelliptic cryptosystems.
Our Order Counting Method
Beth and Schaefer [BS91] used zeta-function for their constructing elliptic cryptosystems and Koblitz [Ko88, Ko89, Ko98] also used zeta-function of a hyperelliptic curve to construct jacobians of hyperelliptic curves defined over finite fields.
A technical difficulty in our computation on general hyperelliptic curves is that the zeta-function has a complicated form with larger degree. Therefore, it is not easy to compute its exact solutions unlike the previous cases [BS91, Ko88, Ko89, Ko98] . However, it is known that the order of a jacobian can be computed without deciding the solution of its zeta-function [St93, Chapter V] . Therefore, we use this algorithm for our problems.
Throughout this section, F denotes an algebraic function field of genus g whose constant field is the finite field F q and P denotes the set of places of F/K. The definition, the theorem and the corollary shown below are given in the article [St93] .
The complex numbers α 1 , · · · , α 2g are algebraic integers, and they can be arranged in such a way that
We can determine the order of jacobians by the Theorem and the Corollary in the following algorithm. We should note that it is easy to count N 1 , · · · , N g if F q is small. 
, where ζ runs over the n-th root of unity Step4 Return J(C; Fqn ) = L F q n (1)
Jacobians over Finite Fields of Characteristic 2
Koblitz [Ko88, Ko89] considered the security of the discrete logarithm problem over jacobians of genus 2 curves when the definition fields have characteristic 2. However, Frey and Rück [FR94] generalized MOV-reduction to hyperelliptic curves. They have found that some of hyperelliptic cryptosystems presented by Koblitz [Ko89] are breakable in sub-exponential time. In this section, we discuss the security of genus 2 curves which have the form v 2 + h(u)v = f (u) defined over characteristic 2 finite fields. We also discuss the security of genus 3, 4, 5 and 6 curves.
Genus 2 Curves
First, we examine the order of jacobians J(C; F 2 n ) in the case of h(u) = 1, where the degree of f (u) equals to 5. We also examine their factorizations.
Extension degree n of F 2 n were examined from 59 to 89. The reason is that: J(C; F 2 59 ) has the size of 119-bit. J(C; F 2 89 ) has the size of 179-bit. Namely, if the jacobians are secure, their level of security are in the range from approximately RSA-512 to RSA-1024.
1 ( "RSA-n" denotes RSA with n-bit key. ) We have examined whether P max of J(C; F 2 n ) divide (2 n ) k − 1 to confirm the security condition C2'. (P max denotes the largest prime factor of J(C; F q ).) As a result, for example, in the case of f (u) = u 5 + u 3 , J(C; F 2 89 ) has the size of 179-bit and its P max has the size of 134-bit. However, P max divides (2 n ) 12 − 1. Therefore, the jacobian does not satisfy C2' (see also [FR94] ).
In the case of h(u) = 1, We have failed to obtain secure jacobians, which satisfy C1 and C2'. However, in [Ko98] , Koblitz examined the case of h(u) = u and showed examples of secure jacobians. We have examined the case of more wider classes such that h(u) has degree at most g. As a result, J(C; F 2 89 ) of C : v 2 + (u 2 + u + 1)v = u 5 + u + 1 has the size of 179-bit. Its P max has the size of 178-bit. We also confirmed the jacobian satisfies C2'. The factorization of the jacobian is given in Appendix A.
Curves of Genus Larger than 2
Next, we examine J(C; F 2 n ) and their factorizations in the case of curves C : v 2 + v = f (u) have genus 3, 4, 5 or 6, where degree of f (u) equals to 7, 9, 11 or 13, respectively. Table 1 shows the list of the size of J(C; F 2 n ) and the size of P max . The factorizations are given in Appendix A. Extension degree n of F 2 n were examined by n such that J(C; F 2 n ) has the size of larger than 160-bit. Namely, if listed jacobians are secure, their level of security are approximately same as RSA-1024 or with a larger key. The listed equations of curves C have largest P max in fixed extension degree n. In the case of genus 5, all prime factors of J(C; F 2 37 ) have much smaller size than 160-bit. Therefore, J(C; F 2 41 ) are listed.
We have examined whether P max of J(C; F 2 n ) divide (q n ) k − 1 to confirm the security condition C2'. All listed J(C; F 2 n ) satisfy C2'. Namely, P max does 1 The notation "same level of security" is based on the following: One of the most efficient algorithm of integer factoring is the number field sieve method. The method takes exp(c(ln n) 1/3 (ln ln n) 2/3 ) time, where 1.5 < c < 1.9 and n denotes the size of an integer. On the other hand, Pohlig-Hellman method, which is an efficient algorithm for discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curve, takes √ Pmax. Therefore, for example, EC-160 has approximately same level of security as RSA-1024. Table 1 . Jacobians over char 2 finite fields of genus 3,4,5 and 6 curves not divide (q n ) k − 1 with small k. Therefore, the curves shown in Table 1 are secure and have the same or higher level of security as RSA-1024. We implement group operations of the jacobians in software in a later section.
Jacobians over Finite Fields of Characteristic Larger than Two
In this section, we examine genus 2 curves over characteristic 3, 5 and 7 finite fields. Moreover, we examine genus 3 and 4 curves.
Genus 2 Curves
First, we examine the curve C :
, where f (u) has degree 5. Tables 2,  3 and 4 show the list of the size of J(C; F p n ) and the size of P max in the case of p = 3, 5, 7, respectively. Tabulated are in the case that the coefficients of the curves are in {0,1}. The factorizations of J(C; F p n ) are given in Appendix A.
In the case of characteristic 3, extension degree n of F 3 n were examined from 37 to 59. J(C; F 3 37 ) has the size of 118-bit. J(C; F 3 59 ) has the size of 188-bit. As in the last section, if listed jacobians are secure, their levels of security are in the range from approximately RSA-512 to RSA-1024. The listed equations of curves C have largest P max in fixed extension degree n. As in the case of characteristic 3, extension degree n of F 5 n was examined from 23 to 43, and extension degree n of F 7 n was examined from 19 to 37.
We have examined whether P max of J(C; F p n ) divide (p n ) k − 1 to confirm the security condition C2'. All listed J(C; F p n ) in tables 2, 3 and 4 satisfy C2'. Namely, P max does not divide (p n ) k − 1 with small k.
Curves of Genus Larger than 2
Next, we examine the order of jacobians J(C; F p n ) and their factorizations of genus 3 and 4 curves C : v 2 = f (u), where degree of f (u) equals to 7 and 9, respectively. Table 5 shows the list of the size of J(C; F p n ) and the size of the largest prime factor of J(C; F p n ). As in the case of genus 2, there exist secure jacobians which satisfy the condition C2'. The factorizations of J(C; F p n ) are given in Appendix A. Table 2 . genus 2 curves over char 3 fields Table 3 . genus 2 curves over char 5 fields Table 5 . genus 3 and 4 curves over char 3, 5 and 7 fields
Implementation and Timings
In this section, we show software implementation and timings of group operations in jacobians over characteristic 2 finite fields obtained in previous sections.
Computing in Jacobians
we show here an algorithm for addition and doubling of elements D ∈ J(C; F 2 n ). A divisor D is regarded simply as a pair of polynomials D = div (a(u), b(u)) such that deg b < deg a and deg a ≤ g. We give here a brief description of the algorithm for the addition: [Ca87, Ko89] for more details).
Step A1 Compute d1, s1 and s2 which satisfy d1 = gcd(a1, a2) and d1 = s1a1 + s2a2
Step A2 If d1 = 1 then a := a1a2, b := s1a1b2 + s2a2b1 (mod a) else Compute d2, s 1 , s 2 and s3 which satisfy d2 = gcd(d1, b1 + b2 + h) and d2
Step A3 While deg(a3) > g do the following:
If a 1 and a 2 have no common factor, Step A2 to be simpler case. Note that the case gcd(a 1 , a 2 ) = 1 is extremely likely if the definition field is large and a 1 and a 2 are the coordinates of two randomly chosen elements of the jacobian.
When a 1 = a 2 and b 1 = b 2 , i.e., doubling an element of J(C; F 2 n ), we can take s 2 = 0. Moreover, in the case of char F =2 and h(u) = 1, d 1 = 1, s 1 = s 2 = 0, S 3 = 1, and a = a 1 2 , b = b 1 2 + f (mod a). Therefore, In the case of J(C; F 2 n ) and C : v 2 + v = f (u), the doubling can be done in the algorithm as follows.
Step D3 Return D2 = div(a2, b2) Addition and doubling take O(g 3 ) field multiplications. The details of the estimation on the computational cost can be found in [SSI98].
Field Operations
All operations in addition and doubling of D ∈ J(C; F 2 n ) are done by operations in a finite field, because our divisors D (pair of two polynomials) have coefficients in their definition field. We will use a polynomial basis in our implementations.
Representation of Field Elements in Memory
Elements in F 2 n can be represented as n-bit words in computer memory. If CPU has m-bit size of resisters, F 2 n such as n ≤ m are regarded as simply ordinary "unsigned integer". However, unfortunately, if n > m, we need to use "multi-precision" operations for computing. In general, we need such multi-precision operations for RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystems. On the other hand, the order of an abelian variety A(F q ) of genus g lies in the range: St93] . Therefore, if we choose curves carefully, hyperelliptic cryptosystems, which have larger genus g curves compared to elliptic curve, can be implemented without multi-precision library, because an element of the definition field can be stored in computer registers. Such hyperelliptic cryptosystems may have practical performance even though the algorithm for addition of D, shown in the last sub-section, is much more expensive than the algorithm for addition of points on elliptic curves.
Generating Random Divisors
From cryptosystems point of view, we need to have a method of generating a "random" divisor D ∈ J(C; F q n ). In [Ko89] , Koblitz has given such a method in the following way. In our implementation, we have generated divisors D in the method.
We may regard C as defined over
Choose the coordinate u = x ∈ F q at random and attempt to solve v 2 + h(x)v = f (x). In the case of q is even, h(x) = 0 and the change of variables z = v/h(x) leads to the equation
It is easy to see that this equation has a solution z ∈ F q if Tr Fq/F2 a = 0 and does not have a solution if this trace is 1. In the latter case, we must choose another u = x ∈ F q and start again. In the former case, we can find z as follows: If q = 2 n is an odd power of 2, simply set
Timings
We have implemented group operations in jacobians over F 2 n and timed an exponentiation, an addition and a doubling of randomly generated divisors using the algorithms shown in the previous subsection. An exponentiation was done with a simple repeated-doubling method.
The platforms used were Alpha 21164A (467MHz) and Pentium-II (300MHz). Alpha has 64-bit registers and Pentium-II has 32-bit registers. Programs were written in C-language. When extension degree n of F 2 n has a larger size than the register size of the CPU, we used GNU-MP library (gmp-2.0.2) for multiprecision operations. Table 6 shows the processing time of an exponentiation, an addition and a doubling of a randomly given divisor implemented on Alpha 21164A (467MHz) and Pentium-II (300MHz). The order of each jacobians J(C; F 2 n ) have the largest prime factor which has a larger size than 160-bit, namely, they have the same or higher level of security as RSA-1024 and EC-160.
All jacobians of Table 6 are defined over finite fields F 2 n with n ≤ 64. Therefore, we can implement with no multi-precision library over Alpha 21164A (467MHz). J(C; F 2 59 ) of genus 3 curve C : v 2 + v = u 7 achieved 83.3 msec. in an exponentiation. Moreover, in the case of Pentium, we should focus on the case Table 7 . Timings of jacobians of C : v 2 + v = u 2g+1 which have the same level of security as RSA-2048 or RSA-5000 over Alpha 21164A (467MHz) J(C; F 2 29 ) of genus 6 curve C : v 2 + v = u 13 + u 11 + u 7 + u 3 + 1. An exponentiation took 476 msec. on Pentium-II (300MHz). This jacobian achieves good performance and faster than other jacobians of smaller genus curves, because of the field size.
Moreover, we have implemented genus 3 and 11 curves, which have the same level of security as RSA-2048 and RSA-5000. Table 7 shows the processing time of C : v 2 + v = u 2g+1 implemented over Alpha 21164A (467MHz). Even if the genus is 11, which has the same level of security as RSA-5000, exponentiation took 1.79 sec because of its small size of the definition field.
In the case of elliptic curve cryptosystems, many techniques for an efficient implementation has been developed, and timings were reported. For example, in [WBV96] , an elliptic curve (over F 2 177 ) exponentiation with 177-bit exponent achieved 72 msec. on Pentium 133 MHz. In [MOC97], an elliptic curve (over F p , p = 2 169 − 1825) exponentiation with 169-bit exponent (of a random point) achieved 32.54 msec. on Sparc 110 MHz. On the other hand, in the case of hyperelliptic cryptosystems, no such a report has been published. Our hyperelliptic curves exponentiation, which have smaller definition fields, are a few times slower than the elliptic curves cases. However, our implementation suggests that hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems may have practical performance.
